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Abstract Microfinance Institutions provide financial services to poor people.
Governance of these organizations is important so that they can operate efficiently
and sustainably. This study analyzes the influence of stakeholders (donors,
employees, customers, and creditors), on board structure (board size and CEO
duality), and on organizational performance. We use a global data set of 379
microfinance institutions from 73 countries, collected from rating organizations.
Supported by stakeholder theory, agency theory and resource dependence theory, we
find stakeholders to be important and have various influences on microfinance
institutions. We find donors to be associated with small boards, non-duality and
better performance. Employees are associated with large boards, while customers are
associated with duality and good financial performance. Creditors opt for duality and
better social performance. Implications and areas for future research are discussed.
Keywords Microfinance institutions  Stakeholders  Board structure 
Performance
JEL Classification G21  G30
1 Introduction
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide financial services to poor families and
microenterprises. Access to microfinance has the potential to help poor people
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smooth consumption, mitigate risks, build assets and improve income. The building
of a self-sustaining microfinance industry is high on the policy agenda (Cull et al.
2009). Still, most MFIs struggle to keep afloat financially without subsidies. Various
policy papers indicate the importance of governance to the performance of MFIs
(Labie and Mersland 2011), and industry actors rate ‘‘governance’’ among the most
important risk factors in the industry (CSFI 2011). However, relatively little is
known on the empirical relation between governance structures and MFI
performance. This study responds to the need for more knowledge on how
stakeholders influence the board structure and performance of MFIs. Particularly,
this study responds to Labie and Mersland (2011), who argue for a more
stakeholder-based approach to determining ‘‘who’’ and ‘‘what’’ really count in the
governance and performance of MFIs.
MFIs are private organizations incorporated as non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), member-based cooperatives or banks1 (Mersland 2009). This means that
the stakeholders who are represented on boards may vary depending on the type of
the MFI. In addition, Labie and Mersland (2011) suggest that good governance is
not only based on the ability to ensure the sustainability of the organization, but also
on strategic vision and transparency. The authors further suggest that this is possible
when organizations adopt a stakeholder approach that includes the key actors in an
organization. Thus, in this study we aim to answer three questions: (1) What is the
representation of stakeholders across different types of MFIs? (2) To what extent do
stakeholders affect an MFI’s board structure? (3) What influence do stakeholders
have on an MFI’s performance?
Similarly to other board members, stakeholders on boards are responsible for
monitoring and advising managers (Hillman et al. 2001). With MFIs’ dual objective
of serving the poor and becoming sustainable, it is suggested that boards play
important roles. We use agency and resource dependence theories (Jensen and
Meckling 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) to discuss the roles of board members.
We also use stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984) to identify and discuss four types of
stakeholder: donors, employees, customers and creditors.
Microfinance policy papers provide several recommendations on how boards of
MFIs should be structured, in particular in terms of size and stakeholder
representation. However, there is little knowledge of which stakeholders are
represented, and how and where they are represented. Also, few empirical studies
have examined the relation between stakeholders and performance in MFIs
(Hartarska 2005; Hartarska and Mersland 2009). The findings of those few are
inconclusive, and this justifies the need for more studies on stakeholder analysis. For
example, Hartarska (2005) found that donors positively influence social perfor-
mance, while Hartarska and Mersland (2009) found that they are not beneficial.
Furthermore, these studies only examine the relation between stakeholders and
performance. We argue that stakeholders may also influence board structure (CEO
duality and board size). We therefore generally hypothesize that stakeholders on
boards affect board structure and the performance of MFIs.
1 The term bank includes both commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions.
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We use data from public sources, containing 379 MFIs from 73 countries,
collected between 2001 and 2008. We use a mixture of techniques to carry out the
analysis. For MFI characteristics and board structure variables, we use ordinary
least square regressions and probit regression. To tackle endogeneity concerns, we
use a two-stage least square regression with instrumental variables to analyze the
associations between stakeholders and performance.
The results show that stakeholders have various influences on both governance
and MFI performance. We find donors and employees to be better represented in
NGOs, creditors in banks and customers in cooperatives. We further find
stakeholders to be associated with larger and internationally-initiated MFIs. In
terms of board structure, we find donors to be associated with small boards and non-
duality. Thus, the monitoring aspect seems to be important for donors. When donors
interact with creditors, they also opt for small boards. Furthermore, we obtain
evidence that donors and creditors positively affect MFIs’ social and financial
performance. Employees, as resource providers, are associated with large boards,
but are not beneficial for MFI performance. We also show customers to be
associated with duality, lower MFI costs and better financial performance. Similar
evidence is seen when customers interact with employees.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents theory, literature and
hypotheses. Section 3 presents an overview of the dataset, variables and models.
Section 4 presents stakeholder demographics, which is followed by a discussion of
the board structure results in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the results relating to
stakeholder influence on performance and Section 7 concludes.
2 Theory and literature
2.1 Boards and performance
Several studies on corporate governance focus on the relation between boards and
organizational performance (Pugliesse and Wenstøp 2007; Johnson et al. 1996).
Much of the focus has been placed on how board composition, size and CEO/Chair
duality affect board members’ roles and, ultimately, organizational performance
(Elsayed 2011; Larmou and Vafeas 2010). An underlying assumption in this
research is that boards matter; they have the power to affect an organization’s
decisions, strategies, and performance (Judge and Zeithaml 1992).
The roles of boards in executing governance responsibilities have been divided
into two conceptual categories: monitoring and resource provision (Hillman and
Dalziel 2003). The monitoring role charges board members with the responsibility
for representing the interests of various stakeholders. Board members are expected
to monitor actions of managers, as agents, and ensure that they act accordingly
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). Board members’ resource provision role involves
advising the organization and linking it with key constituencies in its external
environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Because the external environment of an
organization is beyond its direct control, it experiences uncertainty. The presence of
board members who represent critical contingencies is presumed to provide the
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organization with access to valuable resources (Hillman et al. 2009). Members with
backgrounds or positions representing important external resources may help the
organization to reduce the transaction costs associated with external interdepen-
dencies and enhance organizational performance.
Board structure and composition are considered important factors influencing the
performance of board roles (Lehn et al. 2009). Similar to Mersland and Strøm
(2009), we examine board structure in terms of board size and CEO duality.
According to agency theory, large boards are inefficient. They are not good
monitors because of the problems that can arise from large groups, such as social
loafing, free riding and higher coordination costs. Jensen (1993) for example argues
that ‘‘When boards get beyond seven or eight people, they are less likely to function
effectively and are easier for the CEO to control’’. Largeness can inhibit a board’s
ability to initiate strategic actions. Judge and Zeithaml (1992) report, that larger
boards are less likely to become involved in strategic decision making. Yermack
(1996) demonstrates that small boards are associated with higher performance. He
concludes that any benefits that may be associated with large boards will be
overwhelmed by poor decision-making processes. In contrast, resource dependence
theory suggests that large boards bring higher organizational performance (Hillman
et al. 2001; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). From this point of view, board size is a
measure of an organization’s ability to form environmental links so as to secure
critical resources. With access to different areas of expertise, CEOs get better advice
from large boards. A larger board may offer an exceptional level of high-quality
advice to a CEO and hence better performance.
CEO duality occurs when one person is both the CEO and the board chair of the
organization (Rechner and Dalton 1991; McNulty et al. 2011). Organizational
literature supports the idea of duality in terms of power and unity of command
(McNulty et al. 2011). To effectively manage, it is necessary for a decision maker to
have clear authority over his/her subordinates (Finkelstein and D’aven 1994). CEO
duality helps to avoid confusion among employees as to who is the boss, which
facilitates effective decision making. Non-duality creates multiple authority
relations that promote role conflict among managers and employees. Agency
theorists posit that duality can entrench a CEO, leading to failed internal control
systems, and challenging a board’s ability to monitor effectively (Mallette and
Fowler 1992). Also, CEO duality represents a conflict of interests, in which a CEO
who is responsible for the strategic management of an organization is also in a
position to evaluate the effectiveness of that strategy (Finkelstein and D’aven 1994).
These arguments suggest that some board members will not advocate CEO duality
because doing so increases the potential for less effective monitoring, which may
endanger organizational performance.
Few studies in the microfinance literature have examined the relation between
board structure and MFI performance. Hartarska (2005) investigates the relation
between governance and performance of MFIs in Eastern Europe. Among other
governance mechanisms, she examines the impact of board size on the MFIs’
performance. Her results indicate that MFIs with smaller boards achieve better
performance. Mersland and Strøm (2009) examine the effect of MFI board size and
CEO duality on MFI performance. Contrary to Hartarska (2005), they do not find
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evidence that performance improves with smaller boards. Nor do they find evidence
of the positive effect of CEO duality on performance. The authors conclude that it is
hard to say whether MFIs are better governed when the CEO is also the board chair.
2.2 Board composition and the presence of stakeholders on boards
When included on boards, it is suggested that stakeholders perform a monitoring
role and provide resources to CEOs and organizations (Hillman et al. 2009; Luoma
and Goodstein 1999). Despite the fact that organizations mainly put stakeholders on
boards as a way of showing how important they are, the organizations also benefit
(Charreaux and Desbrieres 2001). Stakeholders enable organizations to access
various resources, including providing links to other stakeholders. Stakeholder
theory posits that, including stakeholder representatives on boards is a ‘‘formal
mechanism that acknowledges the importance of their relation and interests with the
organization’’ (Mitchell et al. 1997). That is, by including stakeholders on boards,
organizations are signaling their commitment to stakeholders in a visible way
(Freeman 1984). Since different stakeholders have different interests, their inclusion
on boards may affect board structure and organizational performance differently.
Several studies have examined the influence of stakeholders on boards. Luoma
and Goodstein (1999) study the relation between organizational influences and the
addition of stakeholders to boards in the US. Their results show that regulated and
larger organizations have more stakeholders on their boards than unregulated and
smaller organizations. Their study provides important insights into the process by
which board plurality is increased through the addition of stakeholders. Hartarska
(2005) investigates the effects of the inclusion on MFI boards of three types of
stakeholder-donors, employees and customers-on the social and financial perfor-
mance of MFIs. Her findings show that boards with employees result in lower
performance, boards with donors have better social performance, and those with
customer representation have better financial performance. Hartarska and Mersland
(2009) study which governance measures promote efficiency in reaching the poor.
Their results show that MFIs with employees on their boards are less efficient. They
also provide evidence that the presence of donors on boards is not efficient, while
that of creditors is beneficial.
Together, these studies provide evidence that stakeholders are important for the
boards and the performance of MFIs. However, none of these studies examine the
relation between stakeholders and board structure (size and duality). Since a few
studies have found stakeholders to affect organizational performance, we argue that
this influence may be enacted through stakeholders’ effects on board structure. We
now develop hypotheses to examine the relations between stakeholders (donors,
employees, customers and creditors), on the one hand, and board structure and MFI
performance, on the other.
2.2.1 Donors
Donors are important actors through whom MFIs meet their dual objectives.
Schreiner (2002) argues that donors are like genetic engineers, with the role of
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speeding the evolution of MFIs. The literature, further shows that donors are good at
providing funds, measuring progress, and spreading good practice through technical
assistance (Schreiner 2002). As funders, donors need to monitor managers in order
to ensure their funds are spent appropriately (Alonso et al. 2009). This means they
would opt for a board structure that provides room for monitoring, that is, a small
board and non-duality. In terms of performance, we infer that donors are more
interested in social performance, since reaching the poor is part of their mission.
Hartarska (2005) finds that the presence of donors on boards improves social
performance. Other arguments posit that donors fund and assist MFIs, which
demonstrates likelihood for financial sustainability. Furthermore, donors’ objectives
are to increase outreach to the poor. Thus, we expect to find that donors are
associated with small and non-duality boards and we expect donors to positively
influence MFIs’ financial and social performance.
2.2.2 Employees
Corporate literature argues that employees are good at providing inside information
to the board (Osterloh and Frey 2005). In microfinance, employees, particularly
credit officers, are cornerstones of MFIs’ operations (Mori 2010; Batillana and
Dorado 2010). Employees on boards may bring relevant information because they
are better informed about the issues and problems concerning the MFI, sometimes
better so than the CEOs. However, because of employees’ past experiences and
different interests, they may bring biased information, which could mislead the
board when making decisions. In addition, corporate literature suggests that
employees on boards may not be good monitors of CEOs because of the fear they
have of their bosses (Wagner et al. 1998). Employees on boards could also influence
whether the CEO is also the chair, since working for one boss would simplify their
lives (Finkelstein and D’aven 1994). Hartarska and Mersland (2009) show evidence
of a negative association between MFIs boards with employees and performance.
From these findings, it seems that employees are a good source of information for
boards but monitor CEOs less closely than other stakeholders. Thus, we expect
employees to be associated with large and duality boards. In terms of their
information and monitoring roles, we do not hypothesize about their effect on
performance.
2.2.3 Customers
Customers of microfinance are generally poor people with little education. Thus,
one may claim that their representation on boards may not be influential since they
cannot contribute effectively to technical discussions. However, microfinance
customers know what they want and possess enough knowledge to make certain
decisions (Pischke 2002). Furthermore, MFIs are increasingly operating as market-
(customer-) driven and not only product-driven organizations (Woller 2002). With
increased competition, customer drop-outs and multi-borrowing, customer orienta-
tion is increasingly important for MFIs. Woller (2002), for example, suggests that
the key to achieving outreach and sustainability is the extent to which MFIs adopt a
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market-oriented culture. Mersland and Strøm (2009) argue that customers help by
providing better information and thus improve performance. Hartarska (2005) also
finds that customers on boards improve financial performance. According to
resource dependence theory, a board should be large in order to benefit from its
members’ resources; thus we expect customers to be associated with large boards.
To our knowledge, there is no literature that argues in favor of associations between
customers and duality and, therefore, we cannot stipulate their influence in this
regard. We do however expect customer representation on boards to positively
contribute to performance, in terms of the number of customers and sustainability.
2.2.4 Creditors
MFIs are increasingly shifting from donor to debt funding, and creditors represent
an important stakeholder in the industry. In some cases, creditors become board
members. Corporate literature shows that creditors on boards have two implications
for organizations, through loans and accessibility of information (Agarwal and
Elston 2001). As providers of debt, the creditors monitor the process of loan
allocation to the organization. Their representation on boards also provides a strong
channel of information to both parties. For example, the organization may benefit by
knowing where and how to access finance. However, creditors on boards may cause
a potential conflict of interest in relation to organizational financing decisions
(Kroszner 2001). For example, the creditor may influence the management to avoid
taking on certain projects because they could affect the organization’s ability to
repay the creditor. Hartarska and Mersland (2009) find creditors to be beneficial for
MFI performance. The authors argue that, through monitoring, creditors can
positively affect performance. Thus we expect MFIs with creditors on their boards
to have small boards and non-duality and, based on agency theory, better
performance.
2.2.5 Employees and customers
The marketing literature groups customers into two dimensions: internal and
external (Lukas and Maignan 1996). It suggests that the internal customers are the
employees of the organizations, while the external ones are those buying products/
services from the organizations (Bowen 1996). We borrow this notion and want to
look at the interaction effects of both employees and external customers on boards.
Both possess valuable information for the MFI and the board. The nature of MFI
activities requires employees to work closely with external customers (Batillana and
Dorado 2010). We predict that, when both are represented on boards, the boards will
be larger, and more resourceful, which will lead to better MFI performance.
2.2.6 Donors and creditors
Donors and creditors share the characteristic of being providers of funding to MFIs.
The difference is that donors give funding in the form of grants, while creditors give
loans. Despite this difference, they both wish to see the MFI monitored and the
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funds used wisely. Creditors need to recover their loans while donors wish to see
their grants used properly. Interaction between donors and creditors seems to be
important because of this shared characteristic. They both want the MFI to perform
well. Therefore, we predict that boards with both creditors and donors represented
will be small, have non-duality and high performance. Table 1 summarizes all of the
hypotheses.
3 Data and methods
3.1 Data
The data were obtained from secondary public sources. The dataset was compiled
from rating reports available at http://www.ratingfund2.org. These rating reports
were collected by major microfinance rating agencies (MicroRate, Microfinanza,
Planet Rating, Crisil and M-Cril) and contain information from the year 2001 to
2008. Each of the rating agencies is approved to rate and assess MFIs according to
the Rating Fund of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), which is a
branch of the World Bank. Information included in the dataset comprises of gov-
ernance and board variables, financial statements and risk management of MFIs.
The dataset contains 379 MFIs from 73 countries worldwide. Since board-related
issues are reported qualitatively, we also read the reports and identified whether any
stakeholders were sitting on the respective boards. When no information was
available we reported a blank.
The dataset is structured such that annual observations of performance variables
are available for a maximum of five consecutive years. However, governance and
organizational variables are reported only once. Following Mersland and Strøm
(2009), we assume all variables to be constant over the whole period since these are
variables which do not change frequently. Because of geographical and governance
differences between countries, we separately collected information on legal
regimes, based on LaPorta et al. (1997, 2008) and obtained from the World fact
book at http://www.nationmaster.com. The MFIs in the dataset are a mixture of
NGOs, cooperatives and banks. Table 2 provides the distribution of MFIs by type
and geographical location (country).
Table 1 Stakeholders and hypotheses
Stakeholders A. Board structure B. Performance
Board size CEO Duality Social Financial
1. Any-stakeholder ± ± ? ?
2. Donors - - ? ?
3. Employees ? ? ± ±
4. Customers ? ? ? ?
5. Creditors - - ? ?
6. Employees and customers ? ? ? ?
7. Donors and creditors - - ? ?
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Table 2 MFI by country and
type
Name of the country Type of MFI Total
NGOs Cooperatives Banks
Albania 0 0 3 3
Argentina 0 0 1 1
Armenia 2 0 1 3
Benin 4 2 2 8
Bolivia 13 0 2 15
Bosnia 11 0 0 11
Brazil 11 1 1 13
Bulgaria 0 1 1 2
Burkina Faso 0 3 1 4
Cambodia 1 0 11 12
Chile 0 1 1 2
Colombia 6 0 0 6
Dominican Republic 3 0 1 4
Ecuador 8 8 0 16
Egypt 5 0 0 5
El Salvador 2 0 2 4
Ethiopia 0 0 10 10
Georgia 6 0 0 6
Guatemala 5 0 0 5
Haiti 2 0 0 2
Honduras 5 2 1 8
India 23 4 4 31
Indonesia 1 0 1 2
Jordan 0 0 3 3
Kazakhstan 0 0 4 4
Kenya 3 0 6 9
Kyrgyzstan 1 1 1 3
Madagascar 0 1 1 2
Mali 2 1 0 3
Mexico 9 1 6 16
Moldova 0 0 2 2
Morocco 6 0 0 6
Nicaragua 9 1 2 12
Pakistan 1 0 0 1
Paraguay 0 0 1 1
Peru 14 3 12 29
Philippines 6 1 0 7
Romania 0 0 1 1
Russia 4 10 1 15
Senegal 0 9 1 10
South Africa 1 0 2 3
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Since our data is not self-reported, we find it reasonable to assume that the sample
selection bias is minimal and that the sample consists of several random samples of
the governance and performance of MFIs. We do, however, recognize that not all
MFIs are represented in this dataset. Large numbers of small financial cooperatives
and NGOs, for example, are not included. However, we do think this dataset helps in
bringing a global picture of what is happening generally in terms of stakeholder
representation and its influence on the governance and performance of MFIs.
Table 2 continued
Name of the country Type of MFI Total
NGOs Cooperatives Banks
Sri Lanka 1 0 0 1
Tanzania 3 0 1 4
Togo 1 2 0 3
Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 1 1
Tunisia 1 0 0 1
Uganda 4 0 6 10
Montenegro 1 0 1 2
Cameroun 0 1 4 5
Guinee 0 0 1 1
East Timor 0 0 1 1
Bangladesh 1 1 0 2
Nepal 2 0 3 5
Vietnam 1 0 0 1
Azerbaijan 0 0 6 6
Mongolia 0 0 2 2
Nigeria 2 0 1 3
Mozambique 0 0 1 1
Tajikistan 5 0 2 7
Croatia 1 0 0 1
Chad 0 1 0 1
Rwanda 0 1 3 4
Zambia 0 0 1 1
China 1 0 0 1
Serbia 1 0 0 1
Ghana 3 0 0 3
Malawi 0 0 1 1
Gambia 1 0 0 1
Kosovo 1 0 3 4
Congo Braz. 1 0 0 1
Burundi 0 1 0 1
Niger 0 1 1 2
DRC-Kinshasa 0 1 0 1
Total 73 195 59 125 379
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3.2 Model and variables
We use two models to estimate board structure and performance, respectively.
Model 1 looks at board structure and has two dependent variables: board size,
measured as the logarithm of the number of board members and CEO duality, which
is a binary variable (=1 if the CEO is also the board chair or 0 otherwise). Because
of dual objectives of MFIs, we also develop a performance model (Model 2) whose
dependent variables are social and financial performance. There are several
performance variables proposed in the microfinance literature (Rosenberg 2009)
but, in accordance with our hypotheses, we concentrate on those variables we
consider to be of most interest to stakeholders. The financial performance variables
used are portfolio yield, measured as the inflation-adjusted ratio of interest and
revenues to the MFI’s loan portfolio, and financial self sustainability, measured as
the ratio of subsidy-adjusted financial revenue to total expenses. The social
performance variables are the number of customers measured the logarithm of the
total number of customers served by the MFI; and looks at the breadth of outreach
of the MFI. And average loan, measured as logarithm of average loan each
borrower receives; and is concerned with the depth of the outreach, a measurement
of the customers’ poverty level (Schreiner 2002).
The presence of stakeholders on boards is measured as a series of binary
variables, denoting whether there is a donor (yes = 1), customer (yes = 1);
employee (yes = 1) or creditor (yes = 1) on the board. We also have a binary
variable for whether there is any-stakeholder on the board (yes = 1) and, to deal
with interactions between stakeholders, we have binary variables denoting whether
the board has both employee and customer (yes = 1) and both donor and creditor
(yes = 1). To control for variations among and within MFIs, countries and regions,
we include a number of control variables (Mersland et al. 2011). MFI control
variables are size, measured in terms of logarithm of assets possessed by the MFI,
age, measured as the number of years in operation, regulation by central bank
authorities (yes = 1), legal status, denoting whether the MFI is an independent
legal organization (yes = 1) or just a branch of another organization (=0),
ownership type (binary variables denoting whether or not the organization is a NGO,
bank, or cooperative, respectively) and whether the MFI was internationally
initiated (yes = 1).
Among the country and region-specific variables included is competition. This
variable is constructed from the MFI’s information provided to the rating agencies,
and from the agencies’ independent judgment of the MFI’s competitive situation
relative to other MFIs in the country. The higher the score on a scale of one to
seven, the stronger the competition. Also included are regional binaries for
countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa south of the Sahara, Eastern Europe and the
Middle East. As far as we know, we are also the first to include LaPorta et al.’s
(1997, 2008) legal regimes variable (company laws), which denotes countries that
follow French law, English law, Socialist and Germany law in the list of country’s
governance variables. The models are given by the following equations:
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Model 1 : Board structure ¼ f stakeholders þ MFI control variables
þ country control variables þ regional dummies
þ legal regimes þ time dummies
Model 2 : Performance ¼ f stakeholders þ MFI control variables
þ country control variables þ regional dummies þ legal regimes
þ time dummiesÞ
3.3 Summary statistics
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the analyses. In terms
of board structure, the average board size of the MFI is seven members and CEO
duality exists in 17% of the MFIs. The inflation-adjusted portfolio yield is 33%.
Financial sustainability is a widely-used proxy for long-term organizational
sustainability, and the average value of 95% shows that, on average, these MFIs
are not financially sustainable after adjusting for subsidies and other MFI-specific
factors obtained from the rating agency. On average, the MFIs have 14,978
customers, with a minimum of 24 and a maximum of 513,000 customers. This
shows that some of the MFIs have much more outreach than others and this may be
attributed to their experience in the market. The average loan size of USD 751
reflects the ‘‘micro’’ aspect of microfinance. 30% of the MFIs have a stakeholder of
some kind on their board. 9% have donors, 8% have employees, 18% have
customers, and creditors are the least represented, appearing on only 5% of the
MFIs’ boards. Few of the boards have both customers and employees (7%) and few
have both donors and creditors (5%). The MFIs vary in size, with average assets of
USD 6 million (Ln 14.58), while the average time in operation is 10.51 years. These
size and age statistics show that most of the MFIs are small and young, which
justifies the low stakeholder representation, as stakeholders tend to increase with
industry growth (Luoma and Goodstein 1999). Most of the MFIs (91%) have been
established with their own legal status; 27% are regulated, indicating that regulation
and transformation is becoming popular in microfinance industry (Arun 2005).
NGOs make up 51% of the whole dataset, banks form 32 and 17% of the MFIs are
cooperatives. International influence is high in the industry, with 38% of the MFIs
being initiated by international organizations. Average competition pressure is 4.3
which is above the 3.5 middle point of a seven scale. French legal regimes are
leading by 59%, followed by English regimes 25%, socialism 13% and German
regimes 3%. 29% of the MFIs come from Latin America, 25% from Asia, 24% from
Africa south of the Sahara, 18% from Eastern Europe and 4% from the Middle East.
4 Stakeholders’ demographics
4.1 Where are stakeholders represented?
Table 4 shows that 22.9% of the stakeholders sitting on boards of the MFIs are
donors, of whom 13.3% sit on NGOs. This is expected since most donors support
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Table 3 Summary statistics
Variables Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Board structure
Board size 2,673 7.23 3.58 2.00 23.00
Ln board size 2,672 1.87 0.46 0.67 3.14
CEO duality 2,654 0.17 0.59 0.00 1.00
Performance
Inflation-adjusted portfolio yield 1,020 0.33 0.21 -1.46 1.22
Financial sustainability 701 0.95 0.30 0.10 2.21
Customers 990 14,978 34,517 24.00 513,000
Ln customers 990 8.61 1.43 3.17 13.15
Average loan 1,166 751 1,322 1.00 24,589
Ln average loan 1,166 5.90 1.22 0.04 10.11
Independent variables
Any-stakeholder 2,428 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
Donors 2,335 0.09 0.27 0.00 1.00
Employees 2,349 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00
Customers 2,296 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
Creditors 2,328 0.05 0.16 0.00 1.00
Employees and customer 2,032 0.07 0.38 0.00 1.00
Donors and creditor 2,032 0.05 0.27 0.00 1.00
MFI controls
Size—Ln assets 1,228 14.58 1.78 0.43 19.33
Age 2,957 10.51 8.14 1.00 85.00
Legal status 2,918 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00
Regulation 2,921 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
NGO 2,032 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
Bank 2,032 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Cooperatives 2,032 0.17 0.21 0.00 1.00
Internationally-initiated 2,948 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00
Country and regional controls
Competition 2,756 4.29 1.56 1.00 7.00
French countries 2,032 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
English countries 2,032 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Socialist countries 2,032 0.13 0.32 0.00 1.00
Germany countries 2,032 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Region Latin America 2,032 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
Asia 2,032 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00
Region Africa South 2,032 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Region EECA 2,032 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
Region MENA 2,032 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
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NGOs with not-for-profit objectives and are interested in being on boards in order to
monitor the use of their funds (Alonso et al. 2009). Interesting, no donors sit on
cooperative boards. This is at odds with the fact that the United Nations General
Assembly has declared the year 2012 as ‘‘The International Year of Cooperatives’’.
Why then are cooperatives not popular among microfinance donors?
21.3% of the stakeholders sitting on boards are employees and more of these sit
on NGO boards than on other types of MFIs. Since employees provide inside
information, NGOs can benefit from this. It is argued that the cost of having
employees on boards is that they are not good monitors since it is difficult to
monitor one’s bosses (Osterloh and Frey 2005). Having both donors and employees
on the boards of NGOs may be beneficial because donors monitor and employees
provide information. We find customers to be most present on the boards of
cooperatives and also the most well represented of all the stakeholder types. This is
not surprising given that cooperatives are customer-owned MFIs. However, we also
find customers to be represented on the boards of NGOs and banks, which indicates
their importance. Creditors are the least represented on MFI boards and generally
they sit on banks’ boards. Taken together, we argue that stakeholder representation
is a result of MFI type.
4.2 Are MFIs with stakeholders different?
Does stakeholder representation influence board structure and MFI performance?
Table 5 provides t-test results for boards including at least one stakeholder and
those without any.
Boards with stakeholders are larger than boards without them. This confirms the
previous literature, which argues that board size grows with the number of
stakeholders (Hillman et al. 2001). Portfolio yield is used as a proxy for MFI interest
income in relation to their loan portfolio and it shows that MFIs with stakeholders
on their boards charge less than their counterparts. This could indicate that
stakeholders push for low interest rates, but since this is only a univariate it may also
be the result of these MFIs having a larger size. We also find evidence of significant
differences for financial sustainability, in that MFIs with stakeholders on their
boards are more sustainable. In fact, MFIs with stakeholders on their boards have
higher average loans, which is better for sustainability but worse for social
performance. This result indicates that there is a trade-off between servicing the
poor and ensuring good financial results (Hermes et al. 2011). In unreported results,
Table 4 Stakeholders in different types of MFIs
% NGO % Coop % Bank Total %
Donors 13.30 0.00 9.60 22.90
Employees 9.20 4.40 7.70 21.30
Customers 6.70 36.50 3.20 46.40
Creditors 2.90 0.00 6.50 9.40
Total 32.10 40.90 27.00 100.00
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we run the t-test for each type of stakeholder and obtain similar results to those
shown in Table 5. These preliminary analyses illustrate that stakeholders make a
difference to MFIs, both in terms of board structure and performance.
We now look at the relation between six MFI characteristics (size, age,
regulation, legal status, MFI type and internationally-initiated) and stakeholder
representation. The justifications for examining these characteristics are as follows:
Corporate literature suggests that, as organizations become older and larger, the
need for stakeholder inclusion increases, since this improves organizations’ access
to resources (Luoma and Goodstein 1999). Furthermore, the microfinance industry
has a great deal of international influence (Mersland et al. 2011) and this may relate
to the inclusion of stakeholders on boards. Lastly, there has been a move for MFIs
globally to transform and become regulated by central banking authorities
(Hartarska and Nadolyank 2007) and this has an impact on who sits on boards.
We test these relations using probit regression methods in which the dependent
variables are the stakeholder binaries defined earlier. The results are shown in
Table 6.
Table 5 Differences between boards with and without stakeholders
Mean-with Stk. Mean-without Stk. t test diff
Board structure
Board size 8.70 6.90 1.80*
Duality 0.15 0.16 0.01
MFI Performance
Adjusted portfolio yield 0.26 0.35 0.09*
Financial self-sustainability 1.00 0.90 0.10*
Number of customers 15,738.00 13,929.00 1,808.00
Average loan 1,003.00 752.00 251*
* denote significance at 0.01 levels
Table 6 Stakeholders and MFI characteristics
Variable Any-stakeholder Donor Employee Customer Creditor
Size 0.05** 0.022 0.06 0.12** 0.11
Age -0.01 -0.06* 0.01 -0.01 -0.04
Regulation -0.20 0.12 -0.09 -0.45** -0.73*
Legal status 0.53** -0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.03
NGO -2.11 5.36 -0.16 -3.09 4.67
Bank -2.13 5.16 -0.11 -3.15 5.39
Int. initiative 0.43* 0.87* 0.29* 0.30** 0.24
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.16 0.12 0.47 0.14
Probit regressions—regional and time dummies are included. *, ** denote statistical significance at 1%
and 5%
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Large MFIs are more likely to include stakeholders on their boards than smaller
ones. These stakeholders seem to be mainly customers, since only customers are
significantly associated with large MFIs. We also find that younger MFIs have
donors on their boards. This justifies Schreiner’s (2002) notion that donors are
genetic engineers controlling the evolution of MFIs. They sit on boards when MFIs
are young, and later leave them to operate independently. Contrary to Luoma and
Goodstein (1999), we find evidence that regulations do not attract stakeholders onto
boards, which is probably because regulators often do not allow members without
technical banking knowledge to be included on MFI boards.
MFIs with their own legal status include more stakeholders on their boards. It is
remarkable that the characteristic of being internationally-initiated is both
statistically and economically significantly related to most types of stakeholders.
Mersland et al. (2011) show a positive relation between international initiatives and
MFIs’ social performance. We therefore argue that internationally-initiated MFIs
have better performance, caused by, among other things, the inclusion of
stakeholders on their boards.
5 Stakeholders and board structure
Do stakeholders influence MFI board structure? Organizations need board structures
that allow their boards to be efficient in performing their roles (Linck et al. 2008).
Here we run regressions between board structure variables, as dependent variables,
and stakeholders on boards, as independent variables. We do so by including each
stakeholder variable into the regression, and running pooled OLS regressions for
board size and probit regressions for CEO duality. Table 7 gives the results, with
panel A showing those relating to board size and panel B those for CEO duality.
Generally, the results show that stakeholders matter when it comes to which
structure the board adopts. Panel A shows that donors are associated with small
boards, which provides support for the argument that they require a high level of
monitoring. As hypothesized, the presence of employees on boards is significantly
associated with larger boards. Since large boards are a source of resources, and
employees possess unique information, we argue that their board participation is
beneficial. We also show evidence that funders, both donors and creditors, are
associated with small boards. This implies that funders prefer small boards because
it allows them to carry out better CEO monitoring (Yermack 1996).
Panel B shows that, generally, stakeholders are positively associated with CEO
duality. This has two implications. First, it is possible that the CEO invites
stakeholders onto the board, so that they will remain loyal to him or her and select
him or her to chair the board as well. Or, it is possible that stakeholders opt for
duality because they want to avoid dealing with multiple sources of authority and
responsibilities (Finkelstein and D’aven 1994). We find donors to be significantly
associated with non-duality. This relates to the agency argument; the CEO is the
donors’ agent and so they want to monitor him or her.
Surprisingly, customers and creditors are both associated positively with duality.
Customers, we argue, want their interests to be heard, planned for and implemented
N. Mori, R. Mersland
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by one person so as to avoid multiple responsibilities. However, we expected
creditors, as funders, to opt for non-duality. This positive association could be a
result of creditors wanting to hold just one person responsible for their loans.
However, this finding might also be a result of the few observations we have of
creditors sitting on boards. Regarding interactions among stakeholders, we find a
positive association between duality and the presence of both employees and
customers on a board. As internal and external customers, respectively, the results
suggest that they opt for duality in order to have one central authority and ease of
operation under one boss (Rechner and Dalton 1991).
The MFI control variables show significant results in both panels. Larger MFIs
have larger boards as evidenced previously (Adams and Ferreira 2009) and are
associated with duality. MFIs with independent legal status prefer small boards.
This is not surprising since, when MFIs are subsidiaries of other organizations, they
belong to larger, multi-purpose NGOs or large banks, and this leads to large boards.
We also see that MFIs with international initiators have large boards and non-
duality. This is expected given that international actors are probably more familiar
with governance codes, which recommend non-duality. Regulated MFIs are
associated with non-duality; this is often a legal and regulatory requirement for
such institutions. For more checks, we run a board structure model with board
gender diversity but the results were not interesting because of the few observations
we have on this variable. We therefore choose not to report them.
Taken together, we find that stakeholders matter for the type of board structure
put in place by MFIs. This influence may bring different levels of performance for
MFIs. This is examined in the next section.
6 Stakeholders and performance
Does the presence of stakeholders on boards affect MFI performance? Before we
run this model, we need to check for endogeneity. It is possible that, instead of
stakeholders influencing performance, it is performance that leads stakeholders to sit
on boards. Another endogeneity concern is that we might have omitted some
unobservable variable that affects both stakeholders and performance variables
(Adams and Ferreira 2009). For example, some MFIs may be more progressive than
others, and thus have more stakeholders and better performance than others. This
effect could lead to spurious correlations among variables, and so we have to control
for it (Adams and Ferreira 2009). We address these problems by means of
instrumental variables (Wooldridge 2006).
In Section 4 we gave evidence that the number of stakeholders sitting on boards
is greater in internationally-initiated MFIs. Also, MFIs are normally established
either as part of a multipurpose NGO or with their own legal status in a given
country. This has an implication on who sits on the board. If the MFI has its own
legal status, it has more power to choose which stakeholders can sit on its board than
when it is a branch of another organization. Finally, MFIs come in various types:
NGOs, cooperatives and banks. As previously evidenced, MFI type has an
implication on stakeholder representation. Thus, we use internationally-initiated,
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legal status and MFI type as instruments. We conducted a Durbin-Wu Hausman test
(Hausman 1978) and observed that there are endogeneity problems (unreported
results). Then, we ran a two-stage linear regression (2SLS), including three
instruments and other control variables, for each stakeholder variable individually.
Table 8 reports the results for financial performance.
Panel A shows the results for the adjusted portfolio yield. Generally, stakeholders
on a board are associated with low interest returns. We show evidence that the
presence of any-stakeholder, of customers, and of both employees and customers
are all negatively associated with portfolio yield. This means that customers fight
for lower interest rates. However, we show evidence that donors and creditors push
for higher yields. This means that funders want to see MFIs get higher returns in
order, in the first case, for donors to eventually withdraw their support, and in the
second, for creditors to be repaid.
Panel B shows that stakeholders on boards are associated with higher financial
sustainability. This means that when stakeholders sit on boards, they monitor and
give resources that are necessary for MFIs to be sustainable. We find positive
significance results in the case of the presence of any-stakeholder, of donors, of
customers and of both donors and creditors.
These results give support to several hypotheses. The presence of any type of
stakeholder on a board is partially supported, since they bring positive financial
sustainability but a negative portfolio yield. Contrary to Hartarska and Mersland
(2009), we find better financial performance for MFIs with donors on their boards.
This means that donors like to fund, assist and advise MFIs that show a credible
track record of financial performance. This enables donors to withdraw their support
at a later stage, as suggested by Schreiner (2002).
Similarly to the findings of Hartarska (2005), our results provide support for the
presence of an association between customers on boards and financial performance.
Though customers bring negative yields, they are positively associated with
financial sustainability. A similar result is found when both employees and
customers are on the board. This means that customers push for lower interest rates
but not to such a level that prevents the MFI from being sustainable. From pushing
for low interest levels, it means that customers on boards also induce lower costs for
MFIs. The results also support the notion that, in microfinance, employees and
customers work closely together (Mori 2010; Batillana and Dorado 2010).
Furthermore, we find support for the influence of funders—donors and creditors
on boards. They are both associated with better financial performance.
These results indicate that stakeholders push down MFI costs, and to further
check this we run additional regressions (not reported) to see how stakeholders
influence costs. We find that stakeholder presence has negative associations with
operational costs, specifically in the case of any type of stakeholder, customers and
both employees and customers. Thus, the presence of stakeholders on boards leads
to lower MFI costs.
Table 9 shows the results for social performance. Panel A shows the results for
the relation between the presence of stakeholders and the number of customers (the
breadth of outreach). Here, we find that donors are associated with a higher number
of customers and therefore better social performance. The relation is also significant
N. Mori, R. Mersland
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when both donors and creditors are on the same board. As funders, it could be that
these types of stakeholder monitor and advise in a way that leads to more customers.
Alternatively, by having greater inside information, possibly these funders provide
additional funding, allowing the MFI to serve more customers. Interestingly, but not
surprisingly, we find that boards that include customers (who represent the existing
customers), are associated with fewer customers. This means that customers serving
on boards monopolize services for a few people.
Panel B provides the results relating to average loan size. A lower average loan
means higher social performance as poor customers normally take out small loans
(Hermes et al. 2011). We find a positive association between the presence of any
type of stakeholder and average loan size. However, the presence of donors,
creditors and both donors and creditors on the same board are all associated with
low average loans, while customers and both employees and customers on the same
board are associated with high average loans. Again, we find support for the positive
effect of donors on social performance. Most donors have a social mission of
serving the poor; therefore, when they are on a board, they try to monitor and advise
the organization in such a way that meets their objectives. Creditors are shown to be
socially beneficial and associated with low average loans. This is surprisingly, as it
may appear that creditors would prefer the organizations to provide higher and more
profitable loans. However, since most creditors in microfinance also have a social
mission, they are likely to push for greater outreach to the poor (Rhyne 2005). We
also show that customer representation is associated with high average loans. The
results are similar when both employees and customers are represented on the same
boards. It appears that the presence of customers on boards leads to lower social
performance by encouraging MFIs to concentrate on giving higher loans to fewer,
less poor customers.
For the control variables, Tables 8 and 9 show that large MFIs are associated
with lower social and high financial performance. Since large MFIs can source more
funding, they are able to reach more customers, offer higher average loans, make
greater profits and become more financially sustainable. We also observe that
regulated MFIs offer higher average loans and serve fewer customers than non-
regulated ones. This is consistent with the literature that suggests that, as MFIs
transform, they begin to work more with fewer and less poor customers in order to
adhere to regulatory requirements (Hartarska and Nadolyank 2007).
In summary, these results show that stakeholders are beneficial for MFIs and for
those stakeholders represented on the boards (Labie and Mersland 2011). Donors
bring better social and financial performance. Customers on boards produce lower
costs, better sustainability and lower social performance. We do not find evidence
that the presence of employees on boards affect performance, but when both
employees and customers are on the same board, they push for low costs, low
interest rates and advocate larger loans. This is good for employees, since low
interest rates bring in more customers and larger loans which are more profitable for
the MFI and provide better incomes to the employees. When creditors sit alone on
boards, they do not provide much benefit to MFIs. However, when they serve on the
same boards as donors, they become beneficial and lead to better financial and social
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performance. It appears, as funders, they can work better together, than when each
operates individually.
7 Conclusions
This paper responds to the call for research into a deeper understanding of
stakeholders in MFIs (Labie and Mersland 2011). Using a global dataset, we have
shown relationships between stakeholders and MFI characteristics (size, age,
regulation, legal status, MFI type and international initiation), board structure (size
and CEO duality) and performance (financial and social). We used a mixture of
techniques in the analysis. For MFI characteristics and board structure variables, we
used OLS regressions and probit regressions. To tackle endogeneity concerns, we
used a 2SLS regression with instrumental variables to analyze the relation between
stakeholders and performance.
We find stakeholders to be represented differently in different MFI types. Donors
and employees are more on the boards of NGOs, creditors on those of banks and
customers on those of cooperatives. We further find stakeholders to be associated
with larger and internationally-initiated MFIs. Stakeholders show their interests by
having different influences on board structure and performance. Donors are strict in
monitoring (Yermack 1996) and we find them to be associated with small boards,
non-duality and better performance. Similar findings are obtained when boards
contain both donors and creditors. Employees, as resource providers, are found to be
associated with large boards. Customers are associated with duality, better financial
performance but low social performance. Similar evidence is seen when customers
interact with employees on boards.
It is interesting that donors and creditors are associated with better performance
in all cases. This implies that funders are beneficial to MFIs, as advocated by policy
papers (CGAP 2009; Rhyne 2005). The practical implication of this is that donors
and creditors should take a more active role in their partnerships with MFIs. Our
finding that few donors, and particularly creditors, sit on MFI boards should
motivate a reorientation among microfinance funders. They should sit on MFI
boards more often. Donors and creditors should not just fund, they should monitor
and provide other resources. Particularly, as the number of MFI creditors is rapidly
increasing in the industry (http://www.mixmarket.org), there is a need for more
research on their role and their influence on MFIs.
Despite the fact that customers bring lower social performance to MFIs, they are
beneficial in terms of pushing for low costs, while at the same time allowing MFIs
to be sustainable. Most MFIs have high costs of operations and this means that
customers can be beneficial in campaigns to reduce MFI costs. However, the finding
that the presence of customers on boards leads to lower social performance should
be subject of new research. To what extent are the existing MFI customers,
hindering further outreach by microfinance services?
A limitation of our study is that only four types of stakeholder are included.
Future research could examine more types, specifically those not sitting on boards.
How, for example, do rating agencies and local communities (Mersland in press)
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influence MFIs? Finally, the findings that cooperative MFIs do not have donors on
their boards and that customers sitting on the boards of cooperative MFIs have a
negative influence on their social performance merit further study, especially since
2012 is to be the UN’s Year of Cooperatives.
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